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 “Statelessness is the most forgotten global human rights problem in the world today. 
Everyone knows what a refugee is, but many do not know what it means to be stateless.”1 
Stateless people are one of the most vulnerable and marginalized people in the world. Under the 
1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, “‘a stateless person’ means a person 
who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.”2 Despite the 
global consensus on the importance of the basic right to a nationality guaranteed in the article 15 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the number of stateless people continues to grow. 
The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) estimates there are 12 million 
stateless people in the world today,3 while the Open Society Foundations (OSF) claims there 
might be as many as 15 million.4 The full scope of global statelessness is unknown due to the 
lack of procedures to identify stateless people. This results in insufficient research and 
demographic data5 and difficulties of addressing problems of stateless people and providing 
protection.  
 Stateless people suffer from insufficient protection and from insufficient international 
attention to the abuses they suffer in large part because of the complex and confusing definition 
of statelessness in international law. International law divides all people into those who are 
considered nationals by the state and those who are not; the latter includes stateless people. There 
is a further confusion within the definition of statelessness itself that separates all stateless people 
into de jure and de facto stateless granting each category different protections under international 
law. The complexity of the definition affects how the stateless people are identified today and the 
																																																								
1 Antonio Guterres. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, extract from the speech. “Bringing Stateless ‘Out of the 
Shadows’.” Refugee International, (October 26, 2011), http://refugeesinternational.org/blog/bringing-stateless-out-shadows 
2 The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, (1954), Art. 1 
3 The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees Figures at a Glance: Stateless People. 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c26.html 
4 “Faces of the stateless.” Open Society Institute, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/projects/statelessness 
5 Bela Hovy. “Human Rights and Citizenship: The Need for Better Data and What to Do about It.” In Bhabha, Jacqueline (Ed.), 
Children Without a State. The MIT Press, Cambridge, (2011), Ch.4 (pp.89-106) 
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mechanisms that are developed to protect this vulnerable population.  
 In order to shed light on the problems one might face today trying to understand 
statelessness, we need to look at the historical context in which conception of the definition of 
statelessness took place and examine the attempts to address the issue of statelessness prior to the 
codification of the concept in international law by reviewing the documents from the Hague 
Conference (1930) and the Evian Conference (1938), the Memorandum “Statelessness and Some 
of its Causes: An Outline.”(1946), and “The Study of Statelessness” (1949), as well as the 
historical documents that describe the process leading to the conventions, such as the reports by 
the United Nations, academic and legal studies. I will elaborate on the close relationship between 
refugees and stateless people and review how it was addressed prior to the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and then in the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons itself.  I will also revisit the debate about the place of de facto statelessness 
within the definition of statelessness and difficulties it created when it came to the practical 
application of the definition. Based on the documents reviewed for this paper, there is evidence 
that the way definition of statelessness was developed in international law might have been 
influenced by historical context. At the time of codification of the concept of statelessness, it was 
separated from the problem of refugees despite the fact that prior to the codification statelessness 
was viewed solely within the refugee problem. I believe that separation of the refugees and 
stateless people in international law and the introduction of the concept of de facto statelessness, 
which was not later included in the Convention on Statelessness, have contributed to the 
confusion we have today about the definition of statelessness. Finally, I will conclude my paper 
with the contemporary example of how the complex and confusion definition of statelessness 
makes it difficult to identify stateless people today and, therefore, provide them with protection 
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they need.  
 What is statelessness? 
 Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all people regardless of their 
nationality or lack of one are guaranteed protection of their rights. However, in practice, states 
use nationality to regulate who gets access to certain resources and who can benefit from the 
protection of the state. The relationship between a state and a national of the state creates a legal 
bond with rights and obligations. “The importance of the right to a nationality –and the reason 
why the statelessness issue is so important – is that having a nationality is a gateway to other 
rights.”6 Stateless people do not belong or owe allegiance to any state because they do not have a 
nationality; therefore, they might face significant difficulties to benefit from the protection and 
security of any country because they are not allowed to vote or hold public office, and so are 
excluded from the participation in the political and civil life of a country.7 They face many 
barriers, often including but not limited to the denial of education, health care, housing, formal 
employment, due process, and ability to travel freely. In addition, they are often subject to 
violence, discrimination, and trafficking in persons.8  
 Statelessness can result from different circumstances, but all researchers that I reviewed 
for this paper agree that minority communities and children are particularly affected by the 
problem of statelessness. Political change and break ups of states, legal differences between 
countries, forced expulsion, discrimination, renunciation of citizenship, complex inequitable 
laws regulating marriage and birth registration leading to failure or inability to officially register 
																																																								
6 Andrés Ordonez Buitrago. “Statelessness and Human Rights: The Roles of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). EAFIT University, Medelín, Colombia, Vol. 2, 02, (July-December 2011), 11 
7 Indira Goris, Julia Harrington, Sebastian Kohn. “Statelessness: What It Is and Why It Matters.” Forced Migration Review 32 
(Apr 2009), 4-6. 
8 Katherine Southwick and Maureen Lynch. “Nationality Rights for All: A Progress Report and Global Survey on Statelessness.” 
Refugee International, (March 2009), http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/in-depth-report/nationality-rights-all 
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children are among main factors that lead to statelessness.9 When states cease to exist, break up, 
or their territories are transferred and an individual does not obtain new citizenship, he or she can 
become legally stateless, as it happened after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia.10 There are two universal principles to grant citizenship, which are based either on 
the place of birth (jus soli) or family heritage and descent (jus sanguinis).11 In most countries 
nationality laws incorporate both of these principles. However, when nationality is granted 
through paternal descent alone, single women, women living apart from children’s fathers, and 
women married to stateless persons might not be able to pass their nationality on to their children 
or face significant difficulties to do so; therefore, their children can become stateless.12 When 
migrant women from South Asia involved in sex work in Japan abandon their newborns, these 
children become stateless because under Japanese laws they are not eligible for Japanese 
nationality based on the place of birth and cannot inherit a nationality of their absent fathers or 
mothers, who are unwilling to recognize them.13 In addition, if domestic laws only grant 
nationality through parental descent, a child born to two stateless parents would also become 
stateless, as happens in Kuwait, where nationality laws provide no mechanism for the children of 
stateless parents to acquire a nationality at birth.14 In Lebanon, if a woman is married and has a 
child with a stateless man, neither of them can pass their nationality to their children.15  
Dependent nationality, rooted in the discrimination against women, is another mechanism that 
can lead to statelessness.16 For example, some countries, such as Iran, deprive a woman of her 
																																																								
9 “Statelessness.” Refugees International, (March 7, 2008), par. 2, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/what-wedo/statelessness 
10 Clay Collins, David Weissbrodt. “The Human Rights of Stateless Persons.” Human Rights Quarterly 28 (February 2006), 262 
11 Ibid,, 254 
12 Ibid., 254-256 
13 Sachiko Sakamaki. “Stateless Children.” Far Eastern Economic Review 157, 3 (Jan 20, 1994), 38 
14 Collins; Weissbrodt, 255 
15 Amal De Chickera,. “Critiquing the Categorization of Statelessness” in Unraveling Anomaly: Detection, Discrimination and 
the Protection Needs of Stateless People. The Equal Rights Trust, (July, 2010), 57 
16 Collins,Weissbrodt, 257 
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nationality, if she marries a non-national.17 If a state of husband’s nationality does not provide 
access to a new nationality or strips a woman of her new nationality in the case of divorce or 
death of her spouse and a woman is unable to obtain her former nationality back, she is in danger 
of becoming legally stateless.18  
 In addition, racial and ethnic discrimination are often the underlying factors of 
statelessness. The denial of a nationality or creating the obstacles to obtain one are used by the 
states as tools to marginalize the already vulnerable groups of people. Even in cases when a state 
grants nationality based on jus soli principle, discrimination could still lead to exclusion and 
statelessness. For example, when a child of a Burmese asylum seeker is born in a Thai hospital, 
the birth record is destroyed because the parents are illegal migrant workers.19 The Burmese 
government also denies responsibility considering that many of the parents are not registered 
and, therefore, are not considered nationals of Burma.20 We will come back to why children are 
specifically vulnerable in the section about Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican 
Republic. Another example of ethnic discrimination is the case of the Muslim minority of 
Rohingya. The Rohingya fled to Bangladesh fearing persecution from the military regime in 
Burma but was denied official refugee status in Bangladesh. Unrecognized by either country, the 
Rohingya are legally stateless.21 The Roma minority, who for centuries had faced discrimination 
and exclusion, is another example of this problem. When the Roma in the Balkans fled to escape 
violence between ethnic Albanians and Serbs, they were put in refugee camps. Since many Roma 
do not have legal documentation to prove their identity or prior place of residence, they face 
																																																								
17 Amal De Chickera,. “Critiquing the Categorization of Statelessness” in Unraveling Anomaly: Detection, Discrimination and 
the Protection Needs of Stateless People. The Equal Rights Trust, (July, 2010), 58 
18 Ibid., 58 
19 Maureen Lynch, Melanie Teff. “Childhood Statelessness.” Forced Migration Review, Refugee Studies Center, University of 
Oxford, 32 (April, 2009), par. 6 
20 Ibid., par. 6  
21 “We are Rohingya.” Open Society Institute, http://www.soros.org/indepth/stateless/who_it_affects/rohingya.html 
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tremendous difficulties in returning home after the conflict not only because of the break up of 
Yugoslavia, but also because of the perpetuating cycle of discrimination they continue to face.22  
 From the general overview of statelessness above, it is clear that stateless persons are “a 
rather amorphous group.”23 Because the definition of statelessness is complex and confusing, it 
is often applied to groups of people who are not legally stateless under the definition in 
international law but fall into legal limbo because their status is hard to determine or because 
they are not able to access protection of their home state. To understand the debate that 
surrounds the confusing and complex definition of statelessness today and the difficulties it 
creates for the identification of stateless people, we first need to review the history of the 
conception of the definition of statelessness. 
 Statelessness after the First World War  
 The concept of statelessness existed on international arena before its codification in the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons in 1954, which became a major 
international agreement on the identification of statelessness people and regulation of their 
status. As of April 04, 2012, The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons has 82 
signatories.24 The Statelessness Convention is significant because it represents an effort to define 
the status of unprotected persons who are not refugees.25 It has followed by the Convention on 
Reduction of Statelessness (1961), which obligates states to grant citizenship to children born on 
their territory or to their nationals abroad and focuses on preventing states from simply depriving 
their citizens of a nationality granted by Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
																																																								
22 “We are Roma.” Open Society Institute, http://www.soros.org/indepth/stateless/who_it_affects/roma.html 
23 Paul Weis. “The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
Vol. 10, No.2 (Apr., 1961), 263 
24 United Nations Treaty Collection, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V~3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en#3 
25 Weis, 263 
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Rights.26 While other regional treaty standards and international human rights law supplement 
these conventions, these two conventions are unique global instruments for the protection of 
stateless people.27 To understand the historical context in which codification of the definition of 
statelessness took place, we will first review the pre-Convention documents mentioned in the 
purpose statement. For the purpose of this paper, we will concentrate on the first Statelessness 
Convention (1954), in which the definition of statelessness was codified. 
 1. Refugee Crisis after the First World War and the Problem of National Minorities 
 The first attempts to address statelessness as an international issue appeared after the First 
World War. That war resulted in many refugees in Europe, mostly Russians (almost a million) 
fleeing civil war and revolution, as well as Armenian refugees fleeing extreme violence,28 that 
now classify as genocide.29 However, after WWI, in comparison to the refugee problem, 
statelessness was not considered to be a major issue because the number of stateless people, who 
were not also refugees at the same time, was limited.30 Therefore, the concept of statelessness 
was only viewed within the framework of the refugee problem, because only people who were 
refugees but were also stateless were under discussion.31 The issue of refugees was rooted in 
discrimination of national minorities, who fled persecution in their home states by crossing 
borders into neighboring countries. The problem of discrimination against national minorities 
was addressed in the post-war treaties, which Czechoslovakia, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania 
were pressured by the great powers to sign; Poland had to commit to specific protections for their 
																																																								
26 “The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness with an Introductory Note by the Office of the United Nations High 
Comissioner for Refugees.” (1961), 3 http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb286d8.html 
27 “UN Conventions on Statelessness: Key for Protecting the Stateless.” UNHCR, par.1, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a2535c3d.html 
28 “The Study of Statelessness.” UN, United Nations Publications, Department of Social Affairs,   (August, 1949), Lake Success, 
New York, 5 
29 “Excerpts from the UN Report on Genocide 1985: Paragraph 24 and the Armenian Genocide.” United Nations Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.”  (August 5-30, 1985, Geneva), 1 
30 “The Study of Statelessness,” 4 
31 Ibid., 4 
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Jewish residents in these treaties.32  
 2. Passport restrictions 
 The newly created League of Nations was put in charge of enforcement of the minority 
treaties, which in 1921 created the first High Commissioner for Refugees office headed by a 
Norwegian delegate, Fridtjof Nansen. The task of the High Commissioner’s Office was to help 
“repatriate hundreds of thousands of refugees as well as helping them to acquire legal status and 
attain economic independence.”33 Nansen was the founder of the first legal instrument for the 
protection of refugees, known as Nansen passport. These were issued to refugees as 
identification papers. Prior to WWI there was no serious administrative problems when a person 
moved between the states. Even though passports existed in a number of states, they were mostly 
“diplomatic instruments to designate a person requiring or requesting a special attention” and 
were never a main concern for officials.34 However, during the war states were eager to close 
their borders to unwanted migrants as well as to prevent their needed workforce from leaving. 
Therefore, passports helped to enforce the new regulations restricting travel because they 
identified a person’s nationality and either allowed or prevented one from entering.35 
Introduction of passports during the war was a crucial turning point in how the interstate 
migration was handled because an earlier irrelevant proof of nationality became a necessary 
credential for travel.  
 Passport restrictions made life difficult for many refugees in the 1920s.36 Refugees from 
the Soviet Union, who either had some sort of documentation from the failed Tzar’s regime or 
other forms of documentation from military commanders and municipal officers could not secure 
																																																								
32 Michael Marrus. The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. Oxford University Press, (1985), 70 
33 “Nansen – a man of action and vision.” UNHCR, (September 14, 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/4aae50086.html 
34 Marrus, 92 
35 Ibid., 92  
36 Ibid.,93 
	 10
entry visas to the countries where they intended to seek asylum.37 As the Soviet regime 
stabilized, many groups of people were labeled as “class enemies” and forbidden from taking 
part in the social and political life of the country; these people were forced to flee political 
repression.38 Many of these refugees were Jews from the east, who were not welcomed in places 
like Romania and Poland. These states issued visas for refugees to move along to seek asylum 
elsewhere, but without proper identity documentation they were not allowed to enter other 
countries and were forced to remain in the states where they were unwanted.39 Armenian 
refugees to Western Europe experienced similar problems because they lacked documentation to 
prove their origins. “Having lived under the Ottoman Turks, the infant Armenian Republic, or 
the tsarist empire, they were often the very model of statelessness, coming from regions 
Westerners hardly knew existed.”40 Without international guidelines to handle these cases, it was 
difficult to establish their nationality. In 1922 sixteen nations approved the Nansen passport, 
which was meant to serve as a valid identity document providing refugees with a judicial status 
through a specific international agreement, and allowed an international agency, the High 
Commission, to act on behalf of those who were rejected by the countries of their origins.41 By 
1928, the Nansen passport was recognized by fifty-one governments and became one of the most 
significant achievements to protect refugees and stateless people, most of whom were refugees 
from the Soviet Russia.42 However, by the mid-1920s the Russian refugee situation stabilized, 
once the countries of distribution became clear. The Russians had moved away from Poland, 
Germany and the Balkans further to the West, relieving the pressure from these countries.43 
																																																								
37 Michael Marrus. The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. Oxford University Press, (1985), 93 
38 Ibid., 95 
39 Ibid., 94 
40 Ibid., 94 
41 Ibid., 95 
42 Ibid., 95 
43 Ibid., 96 
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 However, as was mentioned above, statelessness was not recognized as a valid issue at 
that time because the number of cases was limited; it was only viewed within the larger and more 
urgent problem of refugees because most people who could fall under the category of stateless 
were first of all refugees.  
 3. The Hague Conference 
 The first attempts to address cases of statelessness in the international arena were made at 
the Hague Conference, in April of 1930, where the Convention on Certain Questions relating to 
the Conflict of Nationality Laws was adopted and a Special Protocol concerning Statelessness 
was created.44 This protocol provided some guidelines for dealing with people who lost their 
nationality without acquiring another, in order to handle some of those special cases where a 
nationality was undetermined. Article 1 of the Special Protocol states that “if a person, after 
entering a foreign country, loses his nationality without acquiring another nationality, the State 
whose nationality he last possessed is bound to admit him, at the request of the State in whose 
territory he is.”45 However, this protocol has not entered into force lacking the required number 
of ratifications.46 On the other hand, The Convention concerning the International Status of 
Refugees was signed in October of 1933 by Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and was a great achievement to guarantee protection 
of refugees who were admitted on the territory of the signatory states. At the same time, further 
attempts not only to address statelessness but to even understand its nature and the scope were 
not taken until the end of WWII, which compared to WWI, resulted in millions more refugees. 
What was different after WWII is that many of refugees, such as German and Austrian Jews, 
																																																								
44 “Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness.” League of Nations. The Conference for the Codification of International Law, 
(April 12, 1930) 
45 “Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness,” Art. 1 
46 Weis, Paul. Nationality and Statelessness in International Law. Sijthoff and Noordhoff International Publishers B.V. Alphen 
aan den Rijin, The Netherlands, (1979), 27 
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were deliberately deprived of their nationality by the state and others were not qualified for a 
refugee status under the definition but possessed no nationality at the same time.  
 Fascist regime prior to WWII and the attempts to handle the refugee crisis  
 1.“The Jewish problem” 
 The numbers of displaced persons seeking refuge outside of the country of their residence 
continued to grow with the establishment of fascist regimes in Europe in 1930s. It resulted in one 
million German Jewish refugees, and the numbers increased, adding refugees from fascist 
regimes in Italy and, Span, and non-Aryan Catholics in Germany.47 The year 1938 epitomizes 
the turning point for Jews in the Third Reich, when the Nazi regime radicalized and the 
repression against Jews accelerated, leaving them “practically helpless” in their own state.48 
Governments and refugee organizations became increasingly concerned about the emerging 
refugee problem in Europe. By 1938, indeed, the general tendency was to see the refugee 
problem as the “Jewish problem.”49 The number of Jewish refugees doubled from the beginning 
of 1938 to mid-1939.”50 In 1938, an International Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees 
Coming from Germany replaced the 1936 Provisional Agreement Concerning the Status of 
Refugees Coming from Germany. Belgium, France and the United Kingdom signed the 
convention in Geneva.51 Even though the Convention covers topics of welfare, education, labor 
conditions, and rights to due process, it does not mention a key principle of non-refoulement. 
Non-refoulement means that a person who seeks asylum cannot be turned back to the country he 
or she is fleeing from until there is a legal decision on whether the asylum is granted or not. In 
other words, it provides asylum-seekers with temporary safety until the court reviews their claim. 
																																																								
47 “Evian Conference on Political Refugees.” Social Science Review. 12:1/4 (March/December 1938), 515 
48 Michael Marrus.The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. Oxford University Press (1985), 176 
49 Ibid,.178 
50 Ibid.,, 178 
51 “Statelessness and Some of its Causes: An Outline.” Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (March, 1946), 10 
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The absence of a non-refoulement clause meant that there was no guarantee for the German 
refugees that they would not be sent back to the Reich where their lives and freedom were 
endangered. 
 2. Evian Conference  
 In addition, the Evian Conference was organized in France in 1938 to discuss the 
increasing number of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution. U.S and many Latin American 
countries in addition to the Western European states have attended the Conference. During this 
Conference, the was lobbying to secure resettlement in North America of German Jews, the 
largest group of refugees, who were otherwise not welcomed in any European country. However, 
these hopes were shattered. The U.S. made it clear that despite the findings of the Conference, it 
was not going to increase its low annual quota of 27,000 admitted people from Germany, while 
France and the United Kingdom were not willing to take any refugees at all, claiming 
overpopulation.52 Some countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Columbia, Mexico, and Peru 
despite welcoming speeches were not ready to accommodate Jewish refugees. They explained it 
with the lack of resources and different immigration needs. These countries claimed their need 
for agricultural labor and considered German Jews not to be a good fit for it.53 At that point 
German Jews were already referred as “men and women without a country”54 – a term that was 
used later and is still used today to describe stateless people. According to the analysis of the 
Conference, many delegates, including an American delegate Myron Taylor, emphasized the 
urgency to address the issue of German Jews, whom no country wanted to take; he warned other 
delegates about “catastrophic human suffering ahead, if no action was going to take place.”55 A 
																																																								
52 “Evian Conference on Political Refugees.” Social Science Review. 12:1/4 (March/December 1938), 516 
53 Ibid., 517 
54 Ibid., 518 
55 Ibid., 518 
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small result of this conference was the agreement on establishment of the inter-governmental 
organization to deal with the issues of refugees. However, it was not created until after WWII in 
1946, under the same name originally proposed – International Refugee Organization (IRO), and 
was replaced by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees in 1952.56 But for the most 
part, the Evian Conference was simply a discussion resulting in no real action to address the 
problem of Jewish refugees.57 In light of the Holocaust, the Evian Conference has been 
condemned as “an exercise in Anglo-American collaborative hypocrisy.”58 
 In practice, Jewish officials in Europe started sending refugees to uncertain destinations 
in Central and South America. However, they faced the unwillingness of these states to accept 
Jews. Michael Marrus describes how one ship with 930 refugees from Germany traveled to Cuba 
and eventually had to come back to Europe ending up in the countries eventually occupied by 
Hitler, who by the middle of the war was determined to annihilate the Jewish people.59 Only after 
WWII, resulting in millions of displaced people and the establishment of the United Nations 
serving as a platform for addressing the refugee crisis, did the international community 
mobilized again around the refugee issue.60  
The Cases of Statelessness and the Memorandum “Statelessness and Some of Its 
Causes: an Outline” 
 After WWII, there were millions of refugees in Europe. The concrete numbers vary 
because at that time there was still no unified system to record the flow of refugees.61 The United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRA) was established in 1943 on behalf of 
																																																								
56 Guy Goodwin-Gill. “Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 28 July 1951) and Protocol relating to the Status 
of Refugees (31 January, 1967), Introduction; par. 2, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html 
57 “The Evian Conference on Refugees.” The Bulletin on International News. Vol. 15, No 14. Royal Institute of International 
Affairs (July 16, 1938), 610 
58 Ronnie S. Landau. The Nazi Holocaust. I.B.Tauris (2006), 137–140. 
59 Michael Marrus. The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. Oxford University Press (1985), 177 
60 “The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.” UNHCR (September 2011), 1  
61 “The Study of Statelessness.” UN, United Nations Publications, Department of Social Affairs,   (August, 1949), Lake Success, 
New York, 4	
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the United States and became a part of the United Nations in 1945. The purpose of UNRA was to 
provide emergency help to displaced people, and later to assist them, along with the International 
Refugee Organization, with either voluntary return to their home countries or resettlement in the 
new countries, if they were refugees.62 Since the issue of refugees was widely discussed before 
WWII, which resulted in the conventions discussed earlier in this paper, the UNRRA officers 
were specifically trained to identify refugees in order to provide assistance. Refugee is a different 
category from simply a displaced person because, as it was later defined in the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees,  because to be qualified as a refugee one must satisfy a fear of 
persecution clause. A refugee is a person who suffers a “well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”63  
 However, UNRA and IRO officers also came across “numerous cases of undetermined 
nationality, or [of] persons claiming to be stateless,”64 whom officials had difficulties 
categorizing to determine the form of assistance having no guidelines on how to address these 
cases. To help representatives of the IRO and UNRA deal with these cases “in their daily task of 
assessing claims of statelessness,”65 the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, which was 
formed at the Evian Conference in 1938 by 31 of the 32 participating states, distributed a 
Memorandum called “Statelessness and Some of its Causes: An Outline.” It is important to 
																																																								
62 “The Study of Statelessness.” UN, United Nations Publications, Department of Social Affairs,   (August, 1949), Lake Success, 
New York, (August, 1949), 4-5 
63 The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), Art. 2 
64 Statelessness and Some of its Causes: An Outline.” Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (March, 1946), 2 
65 Ibid., 1	
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mention that the Intergovernmental Committee did not have mandate over stateless people but 
was forced to create some guidelines precisely because no other entity had an authority to do so 
while millions of people needed immediate assistance66 and UNRA officers did not know what 
to do. That is why, in the Memorandum the Intergovernmental Committee asks for collaboration 
from the officials who work on the ground in order to revise the Memorandum if the new 
situations that can be classified as statelessness arise.67 
 The Memorandum is the first significant attempt to explain the term statelessness and to 
provide some guidelines for the identification of stateless people. The Memorandum defines 
“‘stateless’ as an individual whom no country recognizes as possessing its nationality,”68 the 
term used later in the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless People. However, it is not 
clear where the definitions come from and how this term was negotiated since the outline does 
not have any citations or references. The Memorandum also explains the reciprocal relationships 
between the nationals of a state and a state “through the medium of their nationality”69 whether 
the nationals are inside of their states or abroad. According to the general principles of 
international law, because of these reciprocal relationships, the national is entitled to protection 
of their diplomatic representatives while abroad. On the other hand, a stateless person is deprived 
of these protections because he or she does not belong to any state.70 The Memorandum also 
addresses some of the ways of how people could have become stateless as a result of the 
reorganization of Europe after WWII and, especially, the collapse of Nazi Germany. It is stated 
																																																								






that the outline has been prepared for the IRO representatives “notably in the Western Zone of 
Germany and Austria,” where these undetermined cases were most numerous.71  
 In a short twenty-four page outline, the Memorandum goes into further differences within 
statelessness and lays out the possible ways one can become stateless. In particular, the 
Memorandum mentions the differences between de facto and de jure stateless. The fact that the 
distinction within the definition of statelessness was drawn prior to the drafting the Convention 
or even studying statelessness to understand how to approach it is important for the purposes of 
this paper. It is important because the difference between de jure and de facto stateless continues 
to be debated every time there is a discussion about extending the limits of the definition of 
statelessness in response to the historical changes.  
 According to the Memorandum, de facto stateless are the persons who, just like de jure 
stateless, “do not enjoy the protection of any Government,” however, what makes de facto 
stateless different is that the latter are formally denationalized by their own state.72  For example, 
German Jews were regarded as German nationals up until the mass denationalization in 1941, 
which made them de jure stateless. However, the term for their status prior to denationalization 
is de facto stateless because the state deliberately refused to provide protection to specific 
national groups even though they were still officially German nationals.73 Moreover, the 
Memorandum goes into further distinctions between the lack of temporary protection and de 
facto statelessness making the definition of statelessness a multilayered term years before the 
need to codify the concept was even addressed. The difference between de facto statelessness 
and the temporary lack of protection seems to evolve around the state’s deliberate refusal to 
provide protection to its citizens in the first case, while in the second case, the state is unable to 
																																																								
71 “Statelessness and Some of its Causes: An Outline.” Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (March, 1946), 2 
72 Hugh Massey. “UNHCR and De Facto Statelessness,” UNHCR Division of International Protection, (April 2010), 3 
73 “Statelessness and Some of its Causes: An Outline,” 4 
	 18
maintain diplomatic and consular representation in the territory for some time due to military 
occupation by a foreign power, absence of a diplomatic recognition, etc. For example, the 
Memorandum describes the situation of refugees from the Soviet Union as the one where they 
only lack temporary protection and are not de facto stateless. However, it is unclear how the time 
frame for “temporary” in the case of the refugees from Soviet Russia was defined since it was 
still an ongoing situation at the time of the writing of the Memorandum. The situation of German 
Jews, on the other hand, was classified as de facto stateless prior to denationalization laws but 
only in retrospect; this term was not used during Nazi regime. Nevertheless, the references in the 
Memorandum to the multiple layers of the definition without further elaboration on where these 
definitions come from and how they were negotiated, seems to epitomize the confusion that 
follows statelessness into its modern conception. We will return to of de facto and de jure 
statelessness later in the discussion about the Statelessness Convention. 
 The Nuremberg Laws: an example of de jure statelessness   
 The Memorandum “Statelessness and its Causes: An Outline” looks into some cases of 
statelessness in European countries and the Soviet Russia due to the re-organization of the 
borders; however, it identifies that a vast majority of cases involved Jewish refugees. According 
to the Memorandum, the case of Jews was different from some post-WWI cases of undetermined 
nationality precisely because German Jews were deliberately denationalized through a decree 
dated on November 25, 1941.74 In 1935, German nationality laws, known as Nuremberg Laws, 
introduced a new concept, which divided all nationals into two separate groups: citizens of the 
Reich and other German nationals.75 German Jews were not legally stateless up until 1941, when 
denationalization took place and the Holocaust started. Prior to this, despite not being granted the 
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right to be citizens of the Reich with their civic rights and military obligations, they were still 
regarded as German nationals, and they were able to leave the country.76 However, in 1941, all 
German Jews, whether they lived abroad or in Nazi Germany, were deprived of their nationality 
and became stateless.77 When the war was over, German and Austrian Jews were not only 
refugees, but were also stateless. However, as it was discussed above, the attempts to address 
statelessness came only after the end of war resulting in the global refugee crisis. 
 Moving towards the Statelessness Convention: “The Study of Statelessness” as an 
attempt to understand the issue of statelessness 
 After the Second World War, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
proclaimed the right to a nationality in the Article 15: “Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
No one shall be arbitrary deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality.”78 The inclusion of the right to a nationality into the UDHR opened doors to search 
for the new ways of dealing with the unprecedented number of stateless people. To better 
understand the newly recognized phenomenon of statelessness, the Human Rights Commission 
requested the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to conduct a study of the existing 
situation of stateless people and develop recommendations. ECOSOC conducted “The Study of 
Statelessness” in 1949 through which it emphasized the need to bring stateless people into the 
orbit of the law. “The Study of Statelessness” serves as a great historical record that provides 
data and describes context in which the definition of statelessness was developing. In addition, 
the findings and recommendations of the Study and the actual outcomes during codification of 
the definition of statelessness help us understand why today we have a confusing and complex 
definition of statelessness, which I will address later in the paper. 
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 In a brief historical overview of statelessness the study stated that until the end of WWI, 
which resulted in socio-political and territorial changes, “statelessness was a limited 
phenomenon and consequently did not greatly disturb international life.”79 However, it became a 
problem after the influx of refugees as a result of WWII, which the study refers to as 
“statelessness… [of] unprecedented proportions.”80 Today many researchers find the 
interchangeable use of the terms statelessness and refugees confusing because we have two 
separate conventions on each issue; however, it might not have been confusing at that point of 
history simply because stateless persons were viewed only within the refugee problem 
framework. “No account has been taken of stateless persons who are not refugees. The only 
thing that can be said is that their number is limited,”81 said the study in reference to the statistics 
regarding stateless people. This is important because the study would be a main guide for 
drafting the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, in which the issue of statelessness 
was meant to be addressed as an additional tool for protection in the form of the protocol. 
  As a result of this Study, a number of solutions were proposed, which can be categorized 
into two opposite propositions:  
1) to create a separate convention  
2) or to draft a protocol in addition to the existing 1933 and 1938 conventions.82  
 First of all, creating an additional convention to the two existing Refugee Conventions 
was considered “a needless and unjustifiable complication” because it would have required 
separating refugees and stateless people and dividing stateless people into different classes 
depending on who could benefit from the earlier refugee conventions and who might require 
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additional protective mechanisms.83 The study says that creating a completely new convention 
on statelessness though might look like an option in a “search for apparent simplicity, runs the 
risk of jeopardizing the results already obtained,” thus, is an “untenable” solution.84 On the other 
hand, simply extending the protections of the two existing Refugee Conventions to the new 
categories of people by adopting an additional protocol on statelessness was presented as a 
simple and fast solution.85 However, the parties to the 1933 and 1938 Refugee Conventions had 
to also sign and ratify the protocol on statelessness for it to enter into force, which could have 
posed some problems. This, as we will see later, is important because the states missed the 
opportunity to sign the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Protocol on Statelessness at the same 
time in order to avoid potential problems that were discussed in the Study of Statelessness. 
Moreover, what was described in the Study as an “untenable” solution mentioned above was 
transformed into a feasible one as a result of circumstances rather than a tactics when the states 
pursued the Statelessness Convention instead of the protocol, which we will discuss later in the 
paper.   
 In addition, like the Memorandum, “The Study of Statelessness” draws the distinction 
between de jure and de facto stateless people in the same manner, without providing references 
to the discussion of the origins of these terms or negotiations that took place. This is also 
important for understanding why the concept of statelessness is so complex, since the 
distinctions between de jure and de facto are continuously used in academic, legal, and policy 
papers without clear agreement on what these terms mean. “The Study of Statelessness” also 
advocated for the establishment of an independent intergovernmental organ to provide stateless 
																																																								
83 “The Study of Statelessness.” UN, United Nations Publications, Department of Social Affairs,   (August, 1949), Lake Success, 
New York, 66 
84 Ibid., 67 
85 Ibid., 66 
	 22
people with some services and protections to make up for the absence of national protection, 
which otherwise should be granted to the nationals by their states, when they are abroad.86   
 Failure to adopt the Protocol on Statelessness to the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees in 1951  
 As it was described above, “The Study of Statelessness” suggested that extending the 
protections of the two existing Refugee Conventions and the new planned Refugee Convention 
to stateless people in the form of the protocol was a simple and fast solution. As a result, it was 
decided a year later at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on drafting the Refugee 
Convention, that an additional Protocol on Statelessness would be a better tool to address the 
specific cases of people, whose situation and needs might have been very similar to refugees, but 
due to the lack of a nationality required a separate category. The idea behind an additional 
protocol was based on a belief that even though all refugees were stateless whether in law or 
practice, not all stateless people could be qualified as refugees unless they could prove a fear of 
persecution 87 based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, were outside the country of their nationality and were unable to return to their 
home countries.88 For example, German Jews, many of whom were denationalized but were 
technically still on German territory, might not have been eligible for the refugee status because 
to be qualified as a refugee, including those who had no nationality, one had to be outside of the 
country of his or her nationality or country of the former habitual residence. Many of German 
Jews were still inside of their home state and were not eligible for refugee status. Therefore, 
these types of cases required a special category.  
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  For the purpose of drafting a protocol, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
created the Ad Hoc Committee consisting of the representatives of thirteen governments. The 
draft of a new Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and a Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons were completed on February 16, 1950. It was agreed in the draft of 
the Protocol to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees that “certain provisions of the 
Convention should apply mutatis mundatis [changing only the things that need to be changed] to 
stateless persons who are not refugees in the sense of the Convention;”89 it was also agreed to 
define stateless persons and address their specific situation in the additional protocol.  
 The Conference of plenipotentiaries on the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee 
took place in Geneva in 1951 with 26 states represented by delegates and two governments by 
observers present. During the Conference the draft of the Refugee Convention and the draft of 
the Protocol on Statelessness were presented for signatures. The delegates were familiar with the 
draft of Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and it was adopted by 24 votes to none; at 
the same time, the members of the Conference did not deal with the substance of the draft of the 
Protocol on Statelessness.90 Paul Weis, who served as a legal adviser at the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in his overview of the Statelessness Convention says 
that one of the reasons why the Conference has not pursued the Protocol was because they “did 
not find time to deal with the draft of Protocol.”91 However, there could be other latent reasons 
that influenced the decision not to deal with the Stateless Protocol that were not apparent in the 
historical documents reviewed for this paper. The draft of the Statelessness Protocol was 
transferred to the United Nations to present to participants of the Conference and to comment on 
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which specific provisions of the Refugee Convention they would also apply to stateless people 
once the Protocol was going to be open for signatures after the Refugee Convention had entered 
into force.92 The new conference on the revision and adoption of the draft of Protocol on 
Statelessness was scheduled to take place in April 1954. All states that attended the first 
conference were invited to participate. 
 The second attempt to adopt the Protocol on Statelessness in 1954 
 Three years after the adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 
new conference was organized in New York and was attended by twenty-seven states and five 
states represented by observers. The purpose of this conference was to review and adopt the 
Protocol of Statelessness, which states did not adopt along with the Refugee Convention in 1951. 
However, during the new Conference the participants began to doubt whether the Protocol was 
going to be “an appropriate document.”93 Because the states did not deal with the Protocol at the 
time of adoption of the Refugee Convention in1951, it caused these later problems.  
   First of all, the protocol was meant to serve as an appendix to the Refugee Convention 
rather than an independent document. It was anticipated that the Refugee Convention and the 
Protocol had to be approved and opened for signature at the same time and, therefore, would be 
singed by the same states as a part of one document.94 Because it did not happen in 1951, it 
“appeared quite possible that the parties to the Refugee Convention and to the Protocol on 
Stateless persons might be different states: in particular some parties to the stateless persons 
agreement might not be parties to the Refugee Convention,”95 simply because they were not 
there. It could have created a strange situation where some states, which were not parties of the 
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1951 Refugee Convention, had to accept provision of the Convention they had not agreed to.  
Therefore, it would have required participants of this new conference to first negotiate and sign 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, because the Statelessness Protocol did not require the 
states to provide the same level of protection to all people who cross the border to seek asylum, 
as required by the Refugee Convention, some non-signatory states to the Refugee Convention 
were only interested in Statelessness Protocol. I will come back to the stricter standards in the 
section on the Statelessness Convention and negotiations on whether refugees had to be included 
in this Convention. 
 In addition, pursuing the Protocol on Statelessness was going to create a problem with 
the application of the mutatis mutandis principle according to which certain provisions of the 
Refugee Convention should apply to stateless persons who are not refugees in the sense of the 
Refugee Convention. Adopting the Statelessness Protocol would require states to accept 
provisions of the Refugee Convention, which they have no obligations to because they have not 
signed the Refugee Convention and might not wanted to agree to the provisions of the Refugee 
Convention.96 Since the Protocol was meant to cover stateless people based on the principle of 
mutatis mutandis, the adaptation of the Statelessness Protocol without Refugee Convention 
would have meant different things in different states and “there would be no uniformity in 
application – in effect, there would be as many agreements as there were parties to the 
document.”97  
 Despite the fact that potential problems of adapting a protocol separately from the 
convention were foreseen in the “Study of Statelessness” discussed earlier, the participants failed 
to adopt the Statelessness Protocol together with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
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Refugees. Therefore, taking all the reasons described above into consideration, the states decided 
by 12 votes to none and 3 abstentions to create the Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons 
instead of the Protocol on Statelessness.98  
 Prior to this moment, statelessness was always viewed solely within the refugee context. 
However, this has changed once it was decided to pursue a separate convention in contrast to a 
protocol. The definition of statelessness in the Statelessness Protocol would have excluded 
people who are eligible under the Refugee Convention but covered those requiring special 
protections. By contrast, at the point of creation of the separate Convention on Statelessness, it 
was agreed not to address the refugee problem in the convention at all.99 The Convention on 
Statelessness was meant to cover all stateless people whether they are refugees according to the 
Refugee Convention or not. At the same time, in the Preamble to the Convention on the Status of 
Stateless Persons it is mentioned that the Statelessness Convention covers stateless people who 
are not covered by the Refugee Convention of 1951 because they might not qualify as refugees 
under the definition. This suggests that at that point of discussion refugee and stateless status are 
not only closely connected but the line between the two is often blurry. However, beside the 
short statement in the Preamble to the Statelessness Convention, there is no mentioning of the 
previously discussed crucial relationship between refugees and stateless people in the 
Statelessness Convention.  
 Another contradictory concern about whether to include refugees in the Statelessness 
Convention had to do with the fact that both Refugee and Statelessness Conventions might be 
applied to the same person given the close relationship between the refugee and stateless 
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status.100 The Refugee Convention is the more favourable instrument101 because it has stricter 
standards for protection of refugees than the Statelessness Convention would. Therefore, 
including refugees in the Statelessness Convention would allow state parties to both conventions 
to choose which convention to apply, therefore, to apply lower standards of protection if they 
wanted. As it was mentioned above, the Refugee Convention requires states to follow the 
principle non-refoulment outlined in the Article 33, meaning that a state cannot turn back a 
person seeking asylum back to the country he or she is fleeing from fearing for his life and 
freedom until there is a legal decision about repatriation according to the principles of the 
Refugee Convention.102 In addition, according to the Article 31, the party states to the Refugee 
Convention cannot penalize illegal entry or presence of refugees who are coming directly form 
the territory they are persecuted at.103 If asylum is granted, refugee is able to enjoy the same 
rights and protections as a national of the state. However, in accordance with the Article 2 of the 
Statelessness Convention, a member state should provide a stateless person with the same 
treatment as it generally provides to aliens.104 That means that the stateless person would not be 
treated as a full citizen and might not be eligible for many public services, such as welfare, low-
income housing, financial aid as well as political participation. Moreover, while the Refugee 
Convention requires an active role from the state in terms of having to accept all asylum seekers, 
the Statelessness Convention deals with the treatment of stateless people already within its 
territory and does not necessarily require contracting states to accept all stateless people. 
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  Based on the review of the documents mentioned above, it appears that separating 
stateless people from refugees in international law was a result of the historical circumstances 
rather than negotiations and deliberate action. I believe, this has contributed to the confusion in 
terms of the definition of statelessness and its application to identify groups of stateless people 
we have today.  
 Confusion about de jure and de facto components of the definition of statelessness  
 The separation of the refugees and stateless people into two separate conventions created 
a confusion on where to draw the line between two categories, which convention to apply, and 
how to deal with the categories of people who fall into grey categories between the refugee and 
stateless as defined by the convention. In addition, there is a further confusion within the 
definition of statelessness itself that separates all stateless people into de jure and de facto 
stateless granting each category different protections under international law. The difficulty of 
identifying “stateless people” lies within statelessness itself. Statelessness is defined by a lack, 
and absence, a negation because it is the opposite of the possession of a nationality; as s 
negative, therefore, it is difficult to prove.105 So the question of two separate categories of de jure 
and de facto statelessness became a point of debate during the Conference on Statelessness and 
continues to be a center of discussion today. There seems to be very little uniformity on what 
these two terms mean. The discussions about separate categories of de jure and de facto 
statelessness are seen in the Chapter II of the Memorandum “Statelessness and Some of its 
Causes: An Outline.”  
 De facto stateless are described as “unprotected persons,” who do not enjoy the 
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protection of their government even though they still posses the nationality of that state.106 As an 
example of the cases of de facto statelessness, the Memorandum talks about the case of German 
Jews, which constituted the largest number of people without a nationality. As it was mentioned, 
prior to 1941, German Jews were still considered German nationals despite their inability to 
exercise their civil and political rights and being denied protections from the state. To clarify the 
term de facto statelessness, the Memorandum compares German Jews to other nationals at that 
time, such as Polish citizens in the Iberian Peninsula and Soviet citizens in Switzerland, who 
only temporarily did not enjoy protection due to “military occupation by a foreign power, 
absence of diplomatic recognition or of resumption of diplomatic relations, etc.,” while German 
Jews were deliberately denied protections by their state.107  
 The differences between de jure and de facto stateless persons were also addressed in 
“The Study of Statelessness.” However, in contrast to the Memorandum, it concluded that 
despite the fact that in practice the status of de facto stateless is similar to de jure stateless, they 
are two different legal categories.108 The study defined de jure stateless as persons “who are not 
nationals of any State, either because at birth or subsequently they were not given any 
nationality, or because during their lifetime they lost their own nationality and did not acquire a 
new one.”109 De facto stateless, on the other hand, were defined as those who “having left the 
country of which they were nationals, no longer enjoy the protection and assistance of their 
national authorities, either because these authorities refuse to grant them assistance and 
protection, or because they themselves renounced the assistance and protection of the countries 
																																																								
106 Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, Statelessness and its Causes: An Outline. (March, 1946), Chapter II 
107 Massey, Hugh. “UNHCR and De Facto Statelessness,” UNHCR Division of International Protection, (April 2010), 3 
108 “The Study of Statelessness.” UN, United Nations Publications, Department of Social Affairs,   (August, 1949), Lake Success, 
New York, 8-10 
109 “The Study of Statelessness.” UN, United Nations Publications, Department of Social Affairs,   (August, 1949), Lake Success, 
New York, 8-9 
	 30
of which they are nationals.”110 The first part of the definition addressed the cases of people, who 
have left their countries of their origin and have been denied protection from their governments, 
but who do not necessarily fulfill the definition of a refugee, unless the person has left his or her 
country due to the fear of persecution. However, the second part, which describes a person 
unwilling to benefit from the protection of his or her state, could more likely qualify this person 
as a refugee, if refusal to receive any protection from the state of person’s nationality is caused 
by the fear of persecution.111 However, neither of these groups was considered legally stateless. 
 In terms of the connection between refugees and stateless, “The Study of Statelessness” 
states that refugees are de jure stateless persons, if they have been deprived of their nationality 
by their country of origin and are de facto stateless persons, if they still posses their nationality 
but cannot enjoy the protection and assistance of their national authorities.112 What is important 
for this paper is that during the time of drafting the 1951 Refugee Convention, delegates believed 
that it was going to offer protection to de facto stateless while the Protocol on Statelessness was 
going to address the special case of de jure stateless.113 However, as it was described above, the 
Protocol was not adopted and it was decided not to include refugees in the Statelessness 
Convention. Thereafter, the question of whether only stateless persons de jure or also stateless 
persons de facto should be eligible for benefits under Article 1 of Statelessness Convention was 
one of the most debated points. After long negotiations, it was decided to apply the Convention, 
as a rule, to de jure stateless persons only and to provide the possibility of extending its benefits 
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to de facto stateless persons.”114 As it was mentioned above, the idea of not including de facto 
stateless people in the definition of statelessness in the Convention was based on the assumption 
that “a person was only stateless de facto he was still considered a national by a state,”115 
therefore, did not a require a special category and protection. 
  However, the possibility of extending the benefits to de facto stateless people despite 
them not being included into the Statelessness Convention created a debate about the meaning of 
the definition of statelessness. In the Final Acts of the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions 
and in the Recommendations it was advised to treat de facto stateless people as far as possible as 
stateless de jure in order to allow them acquire an effective nationality.116 In practice, de facto 
statelessness was left in the legal limbo because it was not included in the definition of 
statelessness in the Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons despite ongoing discussions in 
all pre-Convention documents. At the same time, today despite no clearly defined and mutually 
agreed on definition of de facto statelessness, various actors involved in the study, discussion, 
and protection of stateless people repeatedly use the term of de facto statelessness. Despite the 
fact that “the term has no legal significance,” it is commonly used and has a meaning.117  Even 
UNHCR, which has had a mandate over stateless people since its establishment,118 admits that it 
has not until recently attempted to clearly define what de facto statelessness is, and what legal 
and actual responses to de facto statelessness should be.119 To this day UNHCR claims on their 
website that there is “no universally accepted definition of this term.”120  What is also important 
for this paper is that the separate convention in contrast to a protocol created a gap between 
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refugees and stateless people and left those who fall into grey areas between refugee and 
stateless status, such as de facto stateless, outside of the protections granted by two conventions. 
These historical developments influenced the definition of statelessness and our understanding of 
statelessness overall, which in return creates many difficulties when it comes to the identification 
of stateless people around the world. 
 Why does the history of the definition of statelessness matter today? 
  The complex and confusing definition of statelessness affects how the issue of 
statelessness is handled today. Identification of stateless populations is the first most important 
step to handling the problem of statelessness.121 As Laura Van Waas puts it, “continuing 
contention as to what qualifies an individual as stateless means that different organizations and 
states often still adopt their own approach – not only to the definition itself, but also to 
procedures for the recognition of ‘stateless person status’ and requirements surrounding the 
establishment of proof of statelessness.”122 In reality, according to 2004 UNHCR survey on 
statelessness, only 51.4% of respondents said that there was a procedure for the identification of 
stateless people on the territory of their state.123 According to the findings of my research, there 
seemed to be an initial confusion in terms that took place at the time of the conception of the 
definition in international law, when statelessness was first solely viewed within the refugee 
problem, and then was separated from refugee issue as a result of the historical developments 
described above.  
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 The narrative above suggests that this confusion can be largely attributed to the failure to 
address the issue of statelessness in conjunction with the problem of refugees during the 
adaptation of the 1951 Refugee Convention. There also seems to be a further confusion in the 
terms of de jure and de facto statelessness, which was discussed in many pre-Convention 
documents but was not included into the international human right documents. Moreover, it is 
important to mention that even though there is a debate about the difference between de jure and 
de facto statelessness in the pre-Convention documents reviewed for this paper, it does not seem 
clear where these distinctions come from and how they were negotiated. As a result, today there 
is no clear understanding of who is classified as stateless because the definition of statelessness 
is always interpreted based on the distinctions within the definition itself. In addition, because 
the Statelessness Convention and Refugee Convention are two separate legal documents that do 
not clearly communicate the relationship between two categories, it is not clear for those who 
study statelessness where to draw the line between stateless people and refugees, especially when 
two categories overlap. All of this means that today there still a debate on whom the Convention 
on Stateless should actually cover and why.  
 As it was discussed above, the Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons excludes de 
facto stateless people, who have a bond with their formal nationality but are unable to benefit 
from their state’s protections. Thus the application of the legal definition of statelessness has 
become more and more difficult when it comes to defining people, who potentially had a 
nationality but could not prove, verify, or access it.124 As a result of globalization leading to new 
forms of migration, interest in the issue of statelessness, and the de facto stateless persons in 
particular, has revived in recent years. Currently, those who are referred to as de facto stateless 
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persons are only covered by general international human rights standards with no specific treaty 
that addresses the needs of this vulnerable population. In recent years, UNHCR has made some 
attempts to address de facto statelessness by providing guidelines for the interpretation of the 
definition, such as the UNHCR 2010 Report by Hugh Massey on de facto statelessness used for 
this paper. At the same time, today there seems to be little constituency and agreement on terms 
within the UNHCR itself. For example, even though in earlier stages of the development of the 
definition of statelessness de facto stateless were always considered within the framework of the 
Refugee Convention, in 2010-2011 report UNHCR concluded that most de facto stateless 
persons are not refugees.125  
 Case Study: Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic 
 To illustrate the difficulties of applying the definition of statelessness to identify stateless 
people today, we can look at the case of Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican 
Republic. Until 2004, the right to a nationality in the Dominican Republic was granted based on 
the principle of jus soli, which means that as long a one was born on the territory of the state, he 
or she was a national of this state. However, in 2004 the General Law on Migration in the 
Dominican Republic created a new category of “non-residents,” which included foreign workers, 
undocumented migrants, those who were unable to prove their lawful residence because their 
temporary visas have expired and even those who simply had no documents to prove their 
residency despite living in the Dominican Republic for generations.126 Haitians constituted the 
largest portion of those affected by law. Dominicans of Haitian origin were left, as Open Society 
Foundation calls them, “effectively stateless” due to their inability to prove their lawful residence 
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without proper documentation.127 However, they were still nationals of the Dominican Republic 
because the law did not specifically target them, but was directed at all people who could not 
prove their Dominican nationality.  
 In practice, however, the government made it almost impossible for Haitians to obtain 
copies of their original birth certificates and refused to issue new ones, arguing that they should 
have never been recognized as nationals in the first place, since they were always the nationals of 
Haiti and thus had to acquire a nationality in Haiti.128 These discriminatory practices were 
challenged in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case Yean and Bosico v. 
Dominican Republic. The Court concluded that the Dominican Republic violated the principle of 
jus soli and the American Convention of Human Rights principles of non-discrimination; 
therefore, these discriminatory practices made children of Haitian descent born in the Dominican 
Republic stateless.129 The Dominican Republic did not only rejected the Court’s ruling to change 
the discriminatory laws and administrative practices that denied access to legal records or 
refused to register children born on the territory, but also made changes to the constitution to 
continue to deny many Dominicans of Haitian descent their right to a nationality.130  
 However, what is important for our purposes of understanding the challenges the 
complex definition of statelessness pose, is that there is no clear agreement on whether these 
Dominicans of Haitian descent are actually stateless. The situation looks very similar to the case 
of German Jews during WWII because they are denied access to their nationality by their state. 
However, the situation in the Dominican Republic is different because the law was not presented 
as a deliberate action to target a specific ethnical group. According to the Convention on the 
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Status of Stateless People, Dominicans of Haitian descent are not de jure stateless because they 
could potentially access or establish their nationality under the new law by providing a proof of 
their legal residence in the Dominican Republic and their Dominican nationality, which many 
were eligible for prior to 2004 law but might not have had since the proof was not required.  
 Being unable to prove their Dominican nationality, many Dominico-Haitians have no 
access to it, which definitely makes them de facto stateless. A the same time, inability to prove a 
nationality, as it was discussed earlier in this paper, does not automatically make one stateless. In 
the discussion of the situation of Dominico-Haitians there is little uniformity on whether they are 
stateless or not and which definition are applied to make these statements. For example, they are 
regarded as stateless by the legal analysis of some expert interested parties, such as the U.S. State 
Department131 and the Open Society Foundation, which advocates for the expansion of the 
definition of statelessness. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights considers the situation of 
the children born to the parents of Haitian descent who are unable to prove their nationality as 
stateless. By contrast, UNHCR lists zero as their statistics on statelessness in the Dominican 
Republic, stating that there are people of concern in that region, who are exposed to 
“discrimination, abuse, exploitation and even statelessness,” which they are working on to 
prevent.132 UNHCR explains in the note on statelessness statistics that it only “refers to persons 
who are not considered nationals by any country under the operation of its laws.”133  We can 
assume that it does not consider Dominicans of Haitian descent to be de jure stateless in lines 
with the definition outlined in the Statelessness Convention, while other actors mentioned above 
apply a broader definition of statelessness. 
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At the same time, what matters in practice is that government officials in the Dominican 
Republic refuse to recognize the discriminatory nature of their laws that render people stateless 
or could lead to stateless.134 The debate about whether Dominicans of the Haitian descent could 
be called stateless is largely attributed to the lack of agreement on what statelessness actually 
means in practical terms. In the mean time, there is close to one million of undocumented 
Haitians in the Dominican Republic both born on the Dominican Republic territory and those 
who immigrated a long time before the new law was passed.135 While they live without legal 
identity in the state where they were considered nationals prior to 2004, they are denied access to 
education beyond fourth grade, health care, employment, and equal protection before the law; 
many have become subject to sex trafficking and work exploitation. Children are especially 
vulnerable because without any proof of their Dominican nationality Dominico-Haitians are 
treated like irregular Haitian migrants, thus under the new law cannot register their children and 
acquire a nationality.136 Therefore, the American Court of Human Rights considers them 
stateless.137 In addition, historically Dominicans have xenophobic and racial prejudices against 
Haitians because they perceive Dominican identity as European and Haitian as African. An 
extreme example of xenophobic attitudes is a military massacre of Haitians and Dominico-
Haitians on the border during the ruling of the dictator Rafael Trujillo.138 Due to the widespread 
discrimination, Haitians are already marginalized, often work in a very low paying fields, such as 
manual labor and agriculture, and have difficulties accessing good education or healthcare. 
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However, inability to obtain a proof of legal identity especially furthers the effects of 
discrimination Dominico-Haitians already experience because they are not able to claim their 
rights from the state unless they prove the legal bond between them two. The case of Dominicans 
of Haitian descent illustrates just a small part of the problem of global statelessness, where it is 
not clear who is stateless and why and how to apply the definition of statelessness to ensure 
protection of this vulnerable population. 
Contemporary views on how to address the problem of the confusing definition of 
statelessness 
Today, many researchers and interested parties involved in the issue of statelessness are 
working on addressing the problem of confusing definition. In general, there are two main views 
on how to address this confusion that is attributed to the distinction between de jure and de facto 
statelessness described in the earlier part of this paper:  
1) to expand the definition to include all stateless people whether de jure or de facto;  
2) or to keep it as narrow as possible to only address cases where it has been proven that 
a person indeed does not have any legal nationality in any state. 
1. The arguments for the expansion of the definition  
The argument for the expansion of the definition of statelessness beyond de jure is based 
on the idea that in contrast to a refugee status, statelessness can be a “fluid status.”139 The status 
of de facto stateless people, especially, may fluctuate throughout his or her life. A person may be 
de facto stateless for a brief moment or for their entire lives, be de facto stateless in one country 
but potentially acquire a nationality in another, or become de jure stateless, if no measures are 
taken. Therefore, proponents of the expansion of the definition of statelessness argue that 
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approaching statelessness in a broader, more inclusive manner could help provide some sort of 
protection to people who do not have an effective nationality or those who fall into grey areas 
where they are not eligible to claim refugee status and are not legally stateless at the same time.  
For example, researchers in favor of the expansion of the definition of statelessness, such 
as The Equal Rights Trust, believe that the “narrow construction of de jure and de facto 
statelessness has left many persons without the protections they deserve.”140 Moreover, they 
think that defining the concept of de facto statelessness “in a robust and comprehensive manner” 
is crucial for the identification of stateless people as the first step to providing them with some 
sort of protection.141 In addition, Paul Weis, a former legal adviser at UNHCR, argued not long 
after the adoption of the Statelessness Convention that even though it is an important document 
that draws attention to stateless people and defines them in international law, it might not be 
enough when it comes to the efforts to eliminate statelessness for a much more diverse group 
than refugees.142 
In general, the advocates for the expansion of the definition argue that what really matters 
is the person’s ability to have access to the rights attached to a nationality and not the nationality 
itself since in practice the vulnerabilities of de facto stateless are similar to those of de jure 
stateless.143 For example, Jacqueline Bhabha, a legal researcher of statelessness, writes that those 
who have a nationality but are unable to benefit from the protection of their state are actually 
stateless because these people are unable to enforce their inalienable rights.144 Like other 
proponents of the expansion of the definition, Bhabha argues that “rightlesness” that results from 
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de facto statelessness should be the main concern when it comes to the identification of stateless 
people.145  She gives an example of Roma children in Europe, who “despite their EU citizenship 
are disenfranchised” and denied basic rights and protections attached to the right to a 
nationality.146 Indeed, today many de facto stateless people remain within the borders of their 
state in the same way as German Jews were described as de facto stateless in the “Memorandum 
on Statelessness and its Causes.”   
 The Open Society Foundation also advocates for a much broader application of the 
definition because they identify a very wide range of groups whom they consider stateless 
regardless of whether they completely fulfill the de jure definition of statelessness. Among the 
communities they consider stateless are the Rohignya of Myanmar, Roma in Europe, 
Dominicans of Haitian decent in the Dominican Republic, ethnic Russians in Latvia, Ivorians of 
Burkinabe in Cote d’Ivoire, Namibians in Kenya, Palestinians in the Middle East, Biharis living 
in camps between Bangladesh and Pakistan, Mauritanians in Senegal, Tamils in Sri Lanka, ex-
Czechoslovakians in Slovenia, the Hill Tribe people in Thailand, and opposition supporters, 
farmers and independent media owners in Zimbabwe.147 All these communities experience 
similar violations of their rights due to lack of the nationality or inability to prove one and no 
prospects of finding the ways to do so. As it was discussed at the beginning of the paper and in 
the case of Dominico-Haitians in the Dominican Republic, without legal identity stateless people 
cannot exercise their civil and political rights, such as the right to vote and stand for election, and 
they have no legal protection. Stateless people cannot access their social and economic rights 
and, therefore, are more likely to be poorly educated, with poor healthcare, substandard housing 
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and insecure property ownership, having no employment options except the lowest paying jobs, 
mostly in informal sector, where they can be easily exploited by employers as well as become 
victims of trafficking. Without legal status, stateless people are unable to travel freely.148 
According to literature reviewed for this paper, without any state being responsible for them, 
many of the stateless communities, such as the Rohignya, Roma and others, experience violence 
as an extreme form of ongoing racial and ethnic discrimination all stateless communities face. 
Therefore, the proponents of the expansion of the definition focus on the actual implications of 
statelessness in order to address the human rights violations regardless of whether persons could 
be categorized into specific definitions in order to begin claiming their rights.  
 2. The arguments for keeping the definition of statelessness within its legal limits 
underlined in the Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons 
 On the other hand, some researchers of statelessness, such as Laura Van Waas, who 
worked as a consultant for UNHCR on the issues of statelessness in 2007, argues that there is no 
need to create a special regime for de facto stateless today because they are guaranteed special 
protections within general human rights law since they have a nationality.149 Waas means that 
the legal bond with a state, which de facto still have, assumes that a person can claim his or her 
rights from the state, therefore, is the “subject to the regular system of implementation and 
supervision.”150 On the other hand, de jure stateless are actually stateless and need special 
protections because there is no legal bond between the state and a person to even begin to claim 
their rights.151 She believes that human rights mechanisms are sufficient to ensure the rights of de 
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facto stateless saying that the situation of de facto stateless “simply falls within the ambit of 
general human rights law.”152 Waas does not immediately specify the exact mechanisms but she 
says that “de facto stateless,”(she puts them in quotes) people are usually victims of multiple 
human rights violations and “should be able to assert their rights under that regime.”153 What I 
think she means under “the regime” is the national and international laws according to which the 
states are obliged to guarantee certain rights and provide protection to their nationals. According 
to Waas, de facto stateless are nationals of their states. There are all sorts of national and 
international instruments, which can address cases of discrimination “de facto” stateless face. 
However, de jure stateless need special protection because states have no obligation to people 
who are not their nationals. Waas argues that using “de facto” along side with de jure 
statelessness “maybe counterproductive since it has no legal significance” and hinder the 
implementation of the international standards due to the confusion created by this complex 
definition.154 
 In the same way, even though UNHCR, which has a mandate over stateless people since 
its establishment,155 claimed that “persons who are stateless de facto should as far as possible be 
treated as stateless de jure,”156 it has also recently argued that expanding the definition of 
statelessness to cover de facto stateless “would be doing a grave disservice to persons who 
should be treated as the nationals that they are, rather than as stateless persons.”157 Today 
UNHCR acknowledges the fine line between being recognized as a national but not being able to 
exercise basic rights attached to a nationality. Regardless, in the 2010 expert meeting report 
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UNHCR emphasizes that the definition in the Statelessness Convention is still reserved 
specifically for de jure statelessness. The main point is not whether a person has a nationality but 
has no access to it, “but whether or not the individual has a nationality at all.”158  
One of the reasons why UNHCR prefers not to expand the legal definition of 
statelessness by including de facto stateless is because it would require extending its mandate. In 
this way, UNHCR will be responsible for people, who do not enjoy their rights attached to a 
nationality and are still within their nation state. Therefore, expanding the definition would 
require UNHCR to interfere with state sovereignty.159 UNHCR generally cannot interfere into 
the domestic affairs of a sovereign state unless there is a cross-border situation similar to the 
movement of refugees. In addition, if UNHCR was going to expand the definition to also include 
de facto stateless, there is a dilemma as “to what extent the rights attaching to nationality would 
have to be violated before the persons of concern would qualify as de facto stateless?”160 These 
important questions show that the debate on clarifying the definition of statelessness is an 
ongoing process that presents many challenges. As this paper suggests, this continuous debate 
seems to be a result of the failure to provide a clear definition of statelessness in 1951 during the 
adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as well the failure to address the 
issues of refugees and the special cases of stateless people in the same instruments. 
 Paradoxically, almost sixty years after the Convention on the Status of the Stateless 
Persons was adopted, indentifying persons and communities of stateless people remains one of 
the most difficult issues that surround statelessness today. The legal definition of statelessness is 
clearly defined in the international treaty in one sentence. However, as we have seen in this 
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paper, the attempts to explain this definition in relation to refugees as well as the differences 
between de jure and de facto stateless is a much more complex issue than the legal definition 
itself. Complex and confusing definition of statelessness makes it difficult to identify stateless 
people, collect data on them and, ultimately, ensure their protection while statelessness remains 



















161 Antonio Guterres.  The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, extract from the speech. “Bringing Stateless ‘Out of the 





“2012 Regional Operations Profile – North America and the Caribbean.” UNHCR, (January, 
 2012), Statistical Snapshot, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4915b6.html 
 
Bhabha, Jacqueline. “Arendt’s Children: Do Today’s Migrant Children Have a Right to Have 
 Rights? Human Rights Quarterly, 32, The John Hopkins University Press, (2009) 
 
Buitrago Andrés Ordonez. “Statelessness and Human Rights: The Roles of the United Nations 
 High Comissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). EAFIT University, Medelín, Colombia, Vol. 
 2, 02, (July-December 2011) 
 
Collins, Clay; Weissbrodt, David. “The Human Rights of Stateless Persons.” Human Rights 
 Quarterly 28, (February 2006) 
 
 “Commemorating Refugee and Statelessness Conventions: A Compilation of Summary 
 Conclusions from UNHCR’s Expert Meetings 2010-2011.” UNHCR, (2012) 
 
De Chickera, Amal. “Critiquing the Categorization of Statelessness” in Unraveling Anomaly: 
 Detection, Discrimination and the Protection Needs of Stateless People. The Equal Rights 
 Trust, (July, 2010) 
 
“Excerpts from the UN Report on Genocide 1985: Paragraph 24 and the Armenian Genocide.” 
 United Nations Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
 Minorities.” Geneva, Switzerland, (August 5-30, 1985) 
 
“Evian Conference on Political Refugees.” Social Science Review. 12:1/4, (March/December 
 1938) 
 
“Faces of the stateless.” Open Society Institute, 
 http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/projects/statelessness 
 
Goldston, A. James. “Stateless Children: Implementing the Right to Have Rights.” Open  Society 
 Initiative, (September 15, 2011) 
 
Goodwin-Gill, Guy. “Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 28 July 1951) and 
 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, (31 January, 1967),
 http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html 
 
Goris, Indira; Harrington, Julia; Köhn, Sebastian. “Statelessness: What It Is and Why It Matters.” 
 Forced Migration Review 32, (Apr 2009)	
	
	 46
“Guidelines: Field Office Activities Concerning Statelessness.” IOM/66/98 – FOM/70/98, 
 (September 28, 1998) 
Guterres, Antonio, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, extract from the speech. “Bringing 
 Stateless ‘Out of the Shadows’.” Refugee International, (October 26, 2011), 
 http://refugeesinternational.org/blog/bringing-stateless-out-shadows 
 
Hovy Bela. “Human Rights and Citizenship: The Need for Better Data and What to Do about It.” 
 In Bhabha, Jacqueline (Ed.), Children Without a State. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
 (2011) 
 
“In Dominican Republic, Haitians Grapple With ‘Stateless’ Limbo.” Public Broadcasting 
 Station, (December 17, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-
 dec10/haiti_12-17.html 
 
Landau S. Ronnie The Nazi Holocaust. I.B.Tauris, (2006) 
 
Lynch Maureen. “Dominican Republic, Haiti, and the United States: Protect Rights, Reduce 
 Statelessness.” (January 11, 2007), https://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-
 report/dominican-republic-haiti-and-united-states-protect-rights-reduce-statelessness 
 
Lynch, Maureen; Teff, Melanie. “Childhood Statelessness.” Forced Migration Review, Refugee 
 Studies Center, University of Oxford, 32, (April, 2009) 
 
Marrus Michael. The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. Oxford 
 University Press, (1985) 
 
Massey, Hugh. “UNHCR and De Facto Statelessness,” UNHCR Division of International 
 Protection, (April 2010) 
 
“Nansen – a man of action and vision.” UNHCR, (September 14, 2009), 
 http://www.unhcr.org/4aae50086.html 
 
Perks Katherine, Clifford Jarlath. “The legal limbo of detention.” Forced Migration Review, 
 Refugee Studies Center, University of Oxford, 32, (April 2009) 
 
Robinson, M. David. “Statelessness and the Dominican Republic.” Bureau of Population, 
 Refugees, and Migration at the U.S. State Department and Georgetown Law School, 
 (October 26, 2011), http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/remarks/2011/181082.htm 
 
Robinson Nehemiah. The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Its History and 
 Interpretation. Institute of Jewish Affairs, World Jewish Congress, New York, (1955) 
 
Sakamaki, Sachiko. “Stateless Children.” Far Eastern Economic Review 157, 3, (Jan 20, 1994) 
 
	 47
Southwick, Katherine and Lynch, Maureen. “Nationality Rights for All: A Progress Report and 
 Global Survey on Statelessness.” Refugee International, (March 2009), 
 http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/in-depth-report/nationality-rights-all 
 
“Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness.” League of Nations. The Conference for the 
 Codification of International Law, (April 12, 1930) 
 
“Statelessness.” Refugees International, (March 7, 2008), 
 http://www.refugeesinternational.org/what-wedo/statelessness 
 
“Statelessness: An Analytical Framework for Prevention, Reduction and Protection.” UN High 
 Commissioner for Refugees, (2008), 
 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49a28afb2.html 
 
 “Statelessness and Some of its Causes: An Outline.” Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees,  
 (March, 1946) 
 
“The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.” UNHCR, 
 (September 2011)  
 
 “The Concept of Stateless Persons under International Law Summary Conclusions.” Expert 
 meeting organized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
 Prato, Italy, (27-28 May 2010) 
 
The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness with an Introductory Note by the Office of the 
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (1961),
 http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb286d8.html 
 
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, (1951) 
 
The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, (1954) 
 
“The Evian Conference on Refugees.” The Bulletin on International News. Vol. 15, No 14. 
 Royal Institute of International Affairs, (July 16, 1938) 
 
 “The Study of Statelessness.” UN, United Nations Publications, Department of Social Affairs,   
 (August, 1949), Lake Success, New York 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1948) 
 
“UN Conventions on Statelessness: Key for Protecting the Stateless.” UNHCR, 
 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a2535c3d.html 
 








Van Waas, Laura. “The Statelessness Phenomenon and a first encounter with the International 
 Response.” Nationality Matters: Statelessness Under International Law. School of 
 Human Rights Research Series, Vol. 29, (August, 2008) 
 
 “We are Rohingya.” Open Society Institute, 
 http://www.soros.org/indepth/stateless/who_it_affects/rohingya.html 
 
“We are Roma.” Open Society Institute, 
 http://www.soros.org/indepth/stateless/who_it_affects/roma.html 
 
Weis, Paul. Nationality and Statelessness in International Law. Sijthoff and Noordhoff 
 International Publishers B.V. Alphen aan den Rijin, The Netherlands, (1979) 
 
Weis, Paul “The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.” The International and 
 Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 10, No.2, (Apr., 1961) 
 
 “What is Statelessness?” UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c158.html 
 
 “Where does Statelessness Happen?” Project Statelessness. Open Society Foundations, 
 (February 17, 2012), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/projects/stateless/where-
 does-statelessness-happen 
 
Wooding Bridget. “Contesting discrimination and statelessness in the Dominican Republic.” 
 Forced Migration Review 32, (Apr 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
